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It is comforting to find that, in reference to such matters, public opinion has changed for the better since the days of Jackson.

We have forbore to criticise severely the literary merits of Mr. Stickney's book, for in his Preface he deprecates criticism, and speaks of it as a labor of love. It is not, however, in any proper sense, an autobiography; but, as we have said, merely a compilation of Mr. Kendall's writings, composed mainly of his editorial articles and his private correspondence. The editor has not, it seems to us, used his materials with judgment, but has erred both in selection and arrangement. He has given us, perhaps, what we did not want, an accurate idea of Kendall as a man; but he has not given us what we did want, and what we should naturally expect, such a picture of Kendall's time as would be a contribution to history; but for this failure, Mr. Kendall himself is perhaps responsible. The book is very amusing, but if much shorter would have been more valuable.

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2. — *Oriental and Linguistic Studies. The Veda; the Avesta; the Science of Language.* By WILLIAM DWIGHT WHITNEY, Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in Yale College. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1873.

PROFESSOR WHITNEY'S occasional pieces and reviews are always written with such care and conscientiousness that they are well worthy of republication and preservation in book form. The volume before us embraces four essays on the Vedic literature, one on the Avesta, six on the origin of language and kindred topics, and one on language in education. All, except two which were read before societies, have been published in various periodicals, most of them in these pages. The first, "The Veda," gives a clear and comprehensive description of the confused mass of literature known by that name, with a notice of some of the historical and antiquarian results of its study. The second is an account of "The Vedic Doctrine of a Future Life." The third, "Müller's History of Vedic Literature," reviews Max Müller's work and discusses the chronology of the Vedas. There are also some thoughts on the nature of the Vedic religion. The sixth, "The Avesta," gives the same kind of an account of the Persian religious monument as the first does of the Indian.

The republication of these essays is very timely. It is becoming more and more evident that the philosophy of religion is a legitimate branch of science. Even those who believe there are only two kinds of religions — good ones, divinely inspired, and bad ones, invented by

man himself in his lost condition — are beginning to see that there is a religious nature discernible in man, the development of which is worthy of being traced on the same principles as that of philosophy or civilization. A trustworthy account of the religious books of two great families is exceedingly valuable for those who have not time to read even translations of the books, to say nothing of the books themselves. And no one will deny the fitness of Professor Whitney to give such an account. Although these essays were written some years ago, and are not entirely the results of his own studies, yet his subsequent researches have apparently made no change necessary, and they are all the more valuable as being the joint work of Professor Roth and Professor Whitney. The fourth and fifth deal with the mere translation of the Veda, and are of less interest to the general reader, yet they are valuable as a guide to any who consult these books in translation. The seventh essay, "Indo-European Philology and Ethnology," really consists of two, which, it will be remembered, were originally reviews of two books of widely different aims. The books were alike in this, however, that they both attempted a feeble resistance to the science of comparative philology, and both proceeded from jealousy on the part of men whose opinions otherwise command respect. Professor Key, of University College, London, among other essays generally marked by sound sense and respectable linguistic attainments, had reprinted a querulous criticism of Sanskrit as a basis of linguistic science. Professor Oppert, of the Imperial Library at Paris, had published an opening lecture upon Sanskrit literature, in which he disparages the usefulness of Indo-European philology as a servant of ethnology, and attacks more or less directly the "ethnic coherency" of the Indo-European family. It is safe to say that, in this article, the fangs of these philologists are effectually drawn. So far as their authority would be a bugbear, or the force of their arguments an actual hinderance to linguistic science, they are rendered perfectly harmless. Professor Whitney's uniform moderation and clear-headedness make him a most excellent person to correct partisan views of this kind.

The same qualities, together with a power of sarcasm which we should hardly suspect in so clear and purely a logical mind as his, fit him peculiarly to follow Professor Müller, and pick up the loose ends which that brilliant investigator and fascinating expounder is apt to leave about his lectures on language. This, Professor Whitney does in the eighth article, which contains two reviews (one a reply to Professor Müller) of Müller's second series of lectures, done with an unsparing hand. In fact, the criticism seems, in some places, possibly too sharp and too likely to provoke animosity, rather than to correct errors.

But Professor Müller is not a man to be snuffed out by an article, nor is he such a pet of ours that we feel aggrieved at his discomfiture. The tenth article in like manner erases Dr. Bleck and the Simious theory of language. The ninth, eleventh, and twelfth, containing about one hundred pages, are the most valuable part of the whole book. There have been two views held by linguists in respect to the nature of linguistic science. Some, on the one hand, struck by the regularity of the laws of language and the advantage gained by pure inductive methods have claimed for language a place among the natural sciences. On the other hand, the psychologists, seeing the intimate connection of language with thought, have been led to identify them, and to treat linguistics as a branch of psychology. These two views, represented respectively by Schleicher and by Steinthal, ὁ σκοτεινός, Professor Whitney discusses in a masterly manner, with a view to set the study of language on a sound basis. Accordingly, in the ninth essay, with a broad and deep comprehension of the whole matter, he clears away the dead-wood and underbrush, and sets forth very clearly the present state of the question of the origin of language. He shows what has been already proved and what is the point of divergence in the differing opinions as to the relation of language and thought, and calls attention to the fundamental points to which study should be directed. One question suggested we cannot think so important as it seems to Professor Whitney, namely, whether the first impulse to expression came from without or from within, from an instinct of speech or from a want of communication which experience had caused to be felt. Why not both? Many emotions find expression in speech in the form of interjections. Thought, properly so called, would never, perhaps, have been expressed in this way apart from society and the need of communication, but this instinct or inward impulse would give material to the first attempts of the framers of speech. This idea seems to point to the settlement of the question, without implying that solitary men would ever have produced a language. The theory that language is a natural organism, having an inherent power of growth not determined by the will of man, and that its investigation should be conducted upon the principles of natural science, is refuted in the eleventh essay. Professor Whitney shows clearly that changes of meaning and changes of sound, together with the production of new words, under which processes are included all the growth of language, are determined by the will of man, and hence cannot be called the growth of an organism. The argument is sufficiently though not copiously illustrated, and is clear, and to us convincing. In like manner, the *a priori* method in the study of language is discussed in the twelfth essay, and the doctrines that the mental condi-

tion and relations of consciousness are the actual forces which produce language, and that we must acquaint ourselves with the mental culture which immediately precedes the production of language and similar conditions, if we wish to trace the origin of speech. This class of views he disposes of with the same clearness and breadth of view, with, perhaps, a little more impatience at this form of error than the other. Throughout these essays are scattered the soundest suggestions in regard to the nature of language and its relation to thought, pointing out the direction which investigation must take to find its origin with a view as far removed from the notion of miraculous origin on the one hand as from gross materialism on the other, and in full accord with the soundest views upon development. The essays cannot fail to be of service to both radical and conservative anthropologists, — and who does not anthropologize, either from a scientific or a religious point of view? The author indicates clearly his own view that the science of language is a branch of historical science, and that its methods must be historical, as with everything of which the human will is a factor. This view is undoubtedly in the main sound, and has been accepted by the best students of the subject. At the same time, there is a point of view not suggested by him which harmonizes the conflicting notions. We think the desire to classify the science with others has led to all the difficulty. To us, linguistics is not natural history, nor history, nor psychology, but the science of language; if we consider it as a whole, or if we consider it in its various phases, it is a part of each of the three. The greater part of the material and methods of the philologist is historical, no doubt. But language is a manifestation or function of man, who is an animal, and who has a right to be discussed upon the same principles as other animals. His habits and actions in general are subjects of natural history as much as those of the bee or the beaver. The constant use, too, of inductive reasoning allies language with natural history. So, also, much of the field of investigation lies outside the domain of known facts. The facts themselves are to be reconstructed. Here the process seems not like history, but like geology; although there is no palpable object of investigation, like a trap dike or a cast of a shell. On the other hand, language is indissoluble from thought. New forms of words and new meanings are the result of mental processes; changes of sound depend upon mental as well as physical habits. Hence the growth of speech is intimately connected with the growth and nature of the human mind, and so there is a psychological side to the science of language. It does not surprise us, therefore, that while Curtius with Whitney considers linguistics an historical science, Schleicher should speak of the growth of language and its laws, until, carried away by his metaphor,

he treats it as an organism and discusses the Darwinism of language, or that Steintal should soar a little into the region of metaphysics, and say that language is thought and thought is language, and that their origin must be found by introspection, or that Müller should agree now with one and now with the other as either phase presents itself to his fertile fancy and is reflected in his lively rhetoric.

It seems to us that this view makes the erroneous views of Professor Whitney's opponents less dangerous. The closing essay is a valuable one on the use of language in education, and is one of the few that goes safely in the middle. We commend it, therefore, to extreme men of both parties, physicists and classicists.

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3. — *Keel and Saddle: A Retrospect of Forty Years of Military and Naval Service.* By JOSEPH W. REVERE. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

VERY few are the people whose experience has been so varied and interesting as that of General Revere, and fewer still are those who could have so well described their adventures as he has done. It is in books of this sort that we can more clearly see the difference between the point of view of the traveller and that of the reader. Of as much importance to the wanderer in the strange land is the question of whether or not he shall get his breakfast as it is what ruins or unknown tribes of men he shall meet that day; hence it is that in his description he is tempted to lay greater stress upon what is a matter of indifference to another person, because to himself it was of the greatest moment. It is, indeed, the common and just criticism made against diaries that they are a mere enumeration of trivialities, as most persons' experience of looking over their own arid records will confirm, because the writer trusted to his memory to bear what its importance made him feel incompetent to set down, — the unnecessary data that he recorded being more especially mere mnemonic aids. Moreover, in more important matters it is by no means easy for one who is recording the events of his life to find the true mean between the limits which are set by the curiosity of the public on the one hand and by a sort of impersonal modesty on the other. It requires great tact to interest the hearer or the reader in one's self without an undignified obtrusion which every one is quick to feel and to resent. So much being said about the difficulty of his task, it is with the greater warmth that we call attention to the great skill with which General Revere has done his work, so that no one has any other regret than that he has not told us more. As it